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Penry v. Johnson
121 S. Ct. 1910 (2001)
. Faas
On October 25, 1979, Johnny Paul Penry ("Penry') raped and murdered
Pamela Carpenter ("Carpenter"). ' At the close of the penalty phase of his first
Texas capital murder trial, the jury was instructed to answer three statutorily
mandated "special issues."2 Though Penry offered extensive evidence that he
had mental retardation and was severely abused as a child, the jury received no
instruction "that it could consider and give mitigating effect to that evidence in
imposing sentence."3 The juryconvicted Penryof capital murder in 1980 and the
judge sentenced him to death.'
Following affirmance of his conviction in Texas state court, Penry unsuc-
cessfullysought habeas relief in the federal courts.' After granting certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed based on the absence of instructions on
mitigation during the penalty phase." When Penry was retried in 1990, he was
again found guilty of capital murder.' During the penalty phase, Penry again
introduced evidence regarding his mental impairments and childhood abuse and
the jury was again required to answer the three special issues! The court also
gave the jury a "supplemental instruction" regarding mitigating circumstances.'
1. Penryv. Johnson (Paay]//'), 121 S. CL 1910,1915 (2001), a4g215 F3d 504 (5th Cr.
2000).
2. Id, TEX. CODE OuM. PROC ANN. S 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 &Supp. 1989) (requiring
capital juries to affirmatively answer the following questions: "(1) whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberatelyand with the reasonableexpectation that the death of the deceased or another would resut2) whether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that wo constitute a coninuing threat
to society, and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in Idi1ing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased"). Id
3. Pery/I, 121 S. .. at 1915.
4. Id
5. SeePenry v. Johnson (P6"y fl), 215 F-3d 504, 506 (5th Cr. 2000).
6. Penryv. Lynaugh ("Pmry), 492 U.S. 302,326 (1989) (hlding that without 'instnuctions
informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to... mitigating evidence," jurors could
believe that there was no means by which to avoid imposing a sentence of death if the mitigating
evidence suggests that the defendant does not deserve one).
7. PeiyII, 121 S. Q. at 1916.
8. Id;seeasoTEx. CODE GU M.PROC ANN. S 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 &Supp. 1989).
9. PeHyI, 121 S. Ct. at 1917. The "supplemental instruction" read:
You are instructed that when you deliberate on the questions posed in the special
issues, you are to consider mitigating circumstances, if any, supported by theeiaence
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The jury answered each special issue in the affirmative and the court sentenced
Penryto death."0 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction."
Following another unsuccessful habeas petition, the Fifth Ciruit denied Penry's
motion for a certificate of appealabity. 2  The United States Supreme Court
again granted certiorari to consider Penry's constitutional challenges to the
adequacy of the jury instructions." The Court reversed in part and remanded
in part.
4
presented in both phases of the trial, whether presented by the state or the defendant.
A mitigating circumstance mayinclude, but is not limited to, anyaspect of the defen-
dant's charater and record or circumstances of the crime which tiu believe could
make a death sentence map ropriate in this case. If you fid there are anymkea tncsin ili case, you must decide hor , much we thedeserve,
if airy. ang therefore, giv effect and consideration to them'nasesn the dkfendant s
1e. sonl culpabiliyat the time yu answer the special issue. If you ltermine, when
giving effeci to the mt!gating evidence, if any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a
negative.finding to the issue nder consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an
ap nate response to the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative finding
snm, 'be given to one of the special issues.
Id
10. Id
11. Penryv. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
12. Penry v. Johnson ("Pey X), 215 F3d 504, 506 (5th Or. 2000).
13. Peiyll, 121S. CL at 1918, wt gnrleA Penryv. Johnson, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).
14. PmryIL, 121S. C at 1924. In Pery, the United Stares Supreme Court considered two
issues: (1) "whether the jury instructions at Penry's resentencing complied with the mandate in
Peny]"; and (2) "whether the admission into evidence of statements from apsyhiatric report based
on an uncounseled interview with Penryran afoul of the Fifth Amendment." Id at 1915. The first
question is addressed in Part Ill. With respect to the second question, the relevant facts and the
Court's treatment of the issue are described briefly below.
During the penalty phase of his retrial in 1990, a defense clinical psychologist testified on
cross-examination that he had reviewed a number of records in preparing his testimony, including
a psychiatric evaluation of Penryprepared by Dr. Felix Peebles ("Peebles") in 1977. Id at 1916.
The Peebles report had originallybeen prepared at the request of Penry's then-counsel to determine
whether Penry was competent to stand trial on a 1977 rape charge unrelated to and predating the
rape and murder of Carpenter. Id Over the objection of Pen.,/s counsel, the prosecutor had the
defense psychologist recite that it was Peebless "professional opinion that if Johnny Paul Penry
were released from custody, that he would be dangerous to other persons." Id During his closingargument, the prosecutor recited tifs portion of the Peebles report again. Id
Penry argued that the admission into evidence of the portion of the Peebles report referring
to Penys future dangerousness violated his Fifth A ent pr e against self-incrimination
because he was not warned that what h saito Peebles m laterbe used against him. Id at 1918.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Peebles was not acting as an agent for the
State in order to gather evidence that might be used against Penry" when he interviewed him. Id
at 1918-19. Without deciding the merits of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision on this matter, holding that the Texas court's
decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Id
at 1919. The Court then went on to note that even if i found a Fifth Amendment violation, Penry
would still need to show that the error "bad substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
mining the jury's verdict," and that it was unlikely that Penry could make such a showing. Id at
1919-20 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 US. 619, 637 (1993)).
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The United States Supreme Court held that the trial court's instructions on
mitigating circumstances failed to provide the jurywith a vehicle to give effect to
mitigating circumstances of mental retardation and childhood abuse, as required
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
5
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Because of their wording, the "supplemental instructions" in PemylI placed
the jurors in an impossible situation in which they were essentially made to
choose between honoring their oaths to render a true verdict and giving effect
to Penry's mitigating evidence. 6 The "supplemental instructions" told the jurors
that despite their belief that each of the three "special issues" should be answered
in the affirmative, they could sentence the defendant to life in prison." How-
ever, in order to do this the jurors were required to answer negatively to one of
the "special issues," even if they found the true answer to be yes.'8 Thus, it
would have been neither logicallynorethicallypossible for a juror to follow both
sets of instructions. 9 For this reason the Court found that the instructions
provided an "ineffective and illogical" mechanism by which to give effect to
Penry's mitigating evidence.20
Pemqy I and Pemy I stand for the proposition that a jury must be able to
consider and give meaningful effect to a defendant's mitigating evidence in
imposing a sentence." Ajurycannot give meaningful effect to evidence covered
by an instruction that does not fully convey the concept that it is intended to
convey. Like Texas, Virginia has no model jury instruction specifically dealing
with mental retardation. The mitigation instruction for capital murder cases
functions in concert with the Capital Murder Form Finding. With respect to
15. Pa ryI, 121 S. C. at 1924.
16. Id at'1922.
17. Sw id at 1917.
18. Sw id
19. PaayI/, 121 S. CL at 1922.
20. Id at 1924.
21. Id at 1920; Pemyv. Lynaugh ("Penyl"), 492 US. 302,319 (1989).
22. S~eVA.MODELJURYINTRUUCO Q MlINALNo. 33.127 (Lexis LawPublishing 2000).
The mitigation instruction reads as follows:
If you find that the Conmonweakh has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of an aggravatn circumstance, in dtemig the appropnate punishmen
you shall considr any mitigation evidence presented circuits wich do not
justify or excuse the offense but which in fiirmess or mercy may extenuate or reduce
the degree of moral culpabity and punishment.
Id; sw aso VA. MODEL JURY INTRUCONs QRIM[NAL No. 33.130 (Lexis Law Publishing 2000).
The Capital Murder Form Finding consists of five alternative findings. Id Each finding begins by
2001]
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evidence of mental retardation (a statutory mitigating factor in Virginia),23 and
indeed to any evidence in mitigation of the offense, the Virginia mitigation
instruction does not make clear how a juror maygize #a to such evidence.
In light of this deficiency, suggested amendments to the Virginia ModelJury
Instruction 33.127 are set forth in italics as follows:
If you find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, m determining the
appropriatepunishment you shall consider any mitigation evidence
presented oi circumstances [that] do not justify or excuse the offence
but which in fairness or mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of
moral culpability and punishinent. If ywfu after pwo draiac q t he
ne?4%rzbewp m~zi4a dwaawteir q'zn7SC rfbr is* ymte
)mj shdl& gie&~ to st~h afinrlg by i" *w tin42
This proposed instruction unambiguouslyprovides the jurors with a vehicle for
giving effect to evidence presented in mitigation. Defense counsel should proffer
such an instruction in any capital case in which it presents evidence in
Mitigation.'23 
JeffreyD. Fazio
stating that the Juryfinds the defendant guityof the offense charged. Id The three death sentence
findings, which consist of a finding of two aggravators, and two findings of one aggravator each,
finish with the language, 'and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unani-
mously fix his punishment at death. Id The two life-in-prison findings finish with the
"and having considered all of the evidence in aggnvation and mitigation of such offense, fix his
punishment at imprisonment for life." Id All of the above quoted language origiates in Section
19.2-264.4(D) of the Virginia Code. See VA. CDE ANN. S 19.2-264.4D) - 2000). These
statutory forms were disapproved in Powell v. Commonwealth, 552 S.Eld 344 (Va. 2001). See
Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 175 (2001) (analyzing Powell v. Commonwealth,
552 SE.2d 344, 359 (Va. 2001)). The Model Jury nstructions Committee has revised the forms
found at Criminal Instruction Nos. P33.130A-P33.130G. The new forms as well as forms recom-
mended by the Vrngiua Capital Case Clearinghouse can be found at 14 CAP. DEF.J. 233 (2001).
The revised model forms for death verdicts still refer simply to 'having considered the evidence
mitigation
23. See VA. Q)DE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(B)(v) (Michie 2000).
24. SeeVA.McODELJURYI TRucnomCaMINAL No.33.127 (Lexis LawPublishing2000).
25. For a discussion of the consequences of proffering jury instructions, see Melissa A. Ray,
Mavgid Gidai.. Rqbni Vnwa's McridJsuyltumtd on Vilds anIFusDeDx rmuW ,
13 CAP. DEF. J. 85,100-01 (2000) (analyzing the consequences to defendants of proposing hand-
crafted jury instructions).
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